Vitalik Buterin, co-founder of Ethereum and influential blockchain researcher, has outlined a forward-looking vision for future on-chain mechanism design, advocating a “two-layer structure” that combines accountability with decentralized, capture-resistant preference formation. Buterin’s concept seeks to address governance and coordination challenges in decentralized systems by separating execution from preference judgment — a move away from token-based voting dominance toward more resilient, intrinsic mechanisms.
In a recent post on X (formerly Twitter) responding to community discussions on decentralized platform design, Buterin described a framework consisting of two distinct layers:
- A highly open and accountable execution layer — akin to prediction markets, where participants’ decisions are subject to economic incentives and penalties.
- A decentralized, pluralistic preference and judgment layer — designed to be capture-resistant, non-financialized, and non-token-based, favoring anonymous voting mechanisms such as MACI to prevent collusion and centralization of influence.
How the Two-Layer Structure Works
According to Buterin’s description, the first layer functions similarly to prediction markets, where correctness is rewarded and incorrect judgment results in financial loss. This structure promotes accountability because participants’ stakes are tied directly to outcomes, making it difficult for bad actors to influence decisions without economic risk.
The second layer focuses on establishing collective preferences and judgments in a pluralistic and decentralizedmanner. Buterin emphasized that this layer should avoid token-based governance — where ownership equates to voting power — because such systems are vulnerable to capture, including 51 % attacks or disproportionate influence by large holders. Instead, he proposed anonymous voting systems, ideally implemented using Minimal Anti-Collusion Infrastructure (MACI) or similar privacy-enhancing protocols that make it difficult for participants to coordinate vote buying or dominate outcomes.
Problem With Token-Based Governance
The current model adopted in many decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) ties voting rights to token holdings. Buterin has previously criticized this design as vulnerable to capture and inefficiencies, since wealthy participants can disproportionately influence governance outcomes, leaving smaller stakeholders marginalized. In contrast, a voting layer using anonymous mechanisms aims to maximize intrinsic motivation and a broader range of participation without financial barriers.
MACI and Anti-Collusion Mechanisms
MACI — a cryptographic mechanism designed to protect vote integrity by making individual votes unlinkable and resistant to collusion — would help ensure that voters’ choices remain private and difficult to manipulate, even when identity or stake is known. This preserves the core ethos of decentralization while adding safeguards against common governance attacks.
Implications for DAO and Blockchain Governance
Buterin’s two-layer mechanism design reflects broader concerns about decentralized governance models that have emerged as blockchain ecosystems have matured. Classic token-vote governance has faced criticism for low participation, centralized control by large stakeholders, and susceptibility to collusion. Buterin’s framework attempts to balance accountability (through economic incentives) with pluralistic judgment (through anti-collusion voting).
Industry observers say this dual-layer concept draws inspiration from futarchy, an early governance idea combining prediction markets and collective decision-making, but modernized with cryptographic on-chain tools to strengthen privacy and resistance to manipulation.
Looking Ahead
While still largely theoretical, Buterin’s proposal has sparked renewed discussion about how blockchain protocols can evolve beyond simple token voting systems toward mechanisms that reflect genuine collective preference while protecting against capture. Developers and researchers in the Ethereum community and broader decentralized finance (DeFi) space may adopt elements of this two-layer framework as they design future governance primitives and on-chain coordination tools.
